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INRIA-Rennes Bretagne Atlantique, Rennes, France
Abstract. The pervasiveness of the Internet has lead research and ap-
plications to focus more and more on their users. Online social networks
such as Facebook provide users with the ability to maintain an unprece-
dented number of social connections. Recommendation systems exploit
the opinions of other users to suggest movies or products based on our
similarity with them. This shift from machines to users motivates the
emergence of novel applications and research challenges.
In this paper, we embrace the social aspects of the Web 2.0 by consid-
ering a novel problem. We build a distributed social market that com-
bines interest-based social networks with explicit networks like Facebook.
Our Social Market (SM) allows users to identify and build connections
to other users that can provide interesting goods, or information. At
the same time, it backs up these connections with trust, by associating
them with paths of trusted users that connect new acquaintances through
the explicit network. This convergence of implicit and explicit networks
yields TAPS, a novel gossip protocol that can be applied in applications
devoted to commercial transactions, or to add robustness to standard
gossip applications like dissemination or recommendation systems.
1 Introduction
The advent of Online Social Networks (OSN) has shifted the core of Internet
applications from devices to users. Explicit social networks like Facebook , or
LinkedIn enable people to exploit real-world connections in an online setting.
Collaborative tagging applications such as delicious, CiteULike, or flickr form
dynamic implicit networks of users on the basis of their online activities, interest
profiles, or search queries. Users can not only access and introduce new available
content but they become themselves accessible through the online infrastructure.
Existing online social networks can be grouped into two main categories: explicit
and implicit. In explicit networks, users explicitly determine which other users
they should be connected to. In Facebook or MySpace, they issue and accept
friendship requests. In Twitter , they decide that they wish to follow the tweets
of specific users. In all cases, the topology of the resulting network reflects the
choices of users and often consists of links that already exist between real people.
Explicit networks are therefore very useful in reinforcing and exploiting existing
connections but provide little support for discovering new content [3, 1]. Implicit
networks fill this gap by taking an opposite approach which allows users to
discover new content, and acquaintances [4].
Specifically, implicit networks form dynamic communities by collecting infor-
mation about collateral activities of users, such as browsing websites or tagging
documents, URLs, or pictures. A given user may or may not be aware of the
other members of her own communities depending on the target application.
Other users should be clearly visible if the purpose of the application is to dis-
cover new people, while they may be hidden for the sake of privacy when they
are simply being used as proxies to access new interesting content. In either
case, the ability to establish new social connections is key to identifying new
and useful data.
Recent years have seen the emergence of a significant number of research
efforts and applications exploring the power of each of these two paradigms.
Nonetheless, a lot more can be achieved if both approaches are combined into
a single framework. Consider the following example. John, who lives in London,
bought two electronic tickets for a classical-music concert in Paris, a concert
version of Berenice by Handel, but an unexpected event makes him and his
friend unable to travel to Paris to attend the concert. The concert is tomorrow
and John would like to sell the tickets to someone who can actually attend the
event. Unfortunately, while John has many friends interested in classical music,
they are all based in the United Kingdom. He does know a few people in Paris,
but they are mostly colleagues or friends he met while traveling and who do
not share his musical tastes. He tries calling a few of them but his best bet is
Joseph, who claims to have a friend whose parents often go to classical-music
concerts. Unfortunately, this friend of Joseph’s is out of town and Joseph does
not know how to reach his parents. As a last resort, John posts a message on
a French classical music forum, linking to an EBay ad. However, none of the
classical music fans on the forum are responsive enough and some of them even
become suspicious that the electronic ticket being sold by this new forum user
is actually a fake.
John’s problem would be very easy to solve if he was able to contact someone
that, albeit not knowing him directly, was at the same time interested in the
concert and would trust him enough to buy an electronic ticket from him. This
is exactly what can be achieved by combining the discovery potential of implicit
networks, with the real-world guarantees provided by trusted social links in
explicit ones. While implicit networks do not convey any kind of trust, explicit
links almost always carry some kind of trust properties resulting from being
friends, coworkers and so on.
In our example, the implicit network allows John to identify people that
could be interested in the concert. Among these, he discovers François, a music
teacher from Paris who is trying to buy two tickets for one of his students
and himself. A cross check on the explicit network then allows John to assess
François’s trustworthiness. He finds out that François is actually the cousin of a
French colleague of his wife. This allows the two to gain confidence in each other
and thus complete a safe transaction without external help.
Combining the discovery capabilities of implicit networks with the trust and
confidence that are inherent in friendship relationships is useful not only in
the context of commercial transactions but also in applications like information
dissemination, or recommendation. Consider a distributed news dissemination
system [6]. Users receiving an unusual news item will be more likely to be in-
terested in it if the source or the user that forwarded it is associated with some
level of trust. Similarly, recommendation systems can take into account the trust
of users in other people’s opinions.
The power of combining explicit and implicit social networks, however, has a
cost. First, the enormous amount of information necessary to manage user pro-
files requires significant storage capacity as well as computing power to determine
who the best users are for a given transaction. Second, the associated costs are
equally enormous and can only be afforded by a few very large companies, and
this, in turn, brings significant privacy problems. Modifications in the terms of
service of websites like Facebook have already caused public uproars in multiple
occasions. Most people are rightfully upset at the idea that their personal data
may be collected by a company and sold to third parties for whatever reasons.
The most promising way to continue to use personalized information is therefore
to develop scalable decentralized solutions.
A class of protocols that appear to be particularly suited for this purpose
are those based on the gossip paradigm. Initially introduced in the context of
distributed databases, gossip protocols have rapidly shown their applicability in a
large number of applications including data dissemination, overlay maintenance,
and more recently social networks. In this paper, we extend existing work on
interest-based gossip overlays [4] and propose Social Market, a solution for the
identification of trusted social acquaintances.
Our main contribution in Social Market is TAPS (Trust-Aware Peer Sam-
pling), a novel protocol that operates by directly incorporating trust relation-
ships extracted from an explicit social network into the gossip-based overlay.
This provides each user with a set of neighbors that are not only useful but
that can also benefit from a high degree of trust. Through extensive simula-
tions, we show that Social Market and TAPS achieve performances that are
comparable to those obtained by protocols equipped with global system knowl-
edge, while limiting the diffusion of sensitive trust information. This makes our
solution directly applicable to situations like the social transaction example de-
scribed above. Moreover, our results open new directions for making existing
gossip-based applications more robust in the presence of unreliable users.
2 System Model and Problem Definition
Social Market (SM) is a novel distributed application enabling users to iden-
tify previously unknown social acquaintances that, at the same time, are simi-
lar to them and can be trusted through a chain of explicit social connections,
the trusted path. Selecting similar users is crucial when searching for the right
people for a given transaction, but also when building recommendation or data-
dissemination systems. Trust enables the implementation of transactions without
external help and increases users’ confidence in recommendation results.
We consider a system consisting of a set of users equipped with intercon-
nected computing devices that enable them to exchange information in the form
of messages. Each user is associated with a user profile that characterizes her
interest, her past behavior, her geographical location, and whatever other in-
formation the user wishes to add. The profile is essentially a vector of strings
that can represent, for example, URLs, words, or phrases. We refer to each such
string as a keyword. Each keyword in a profile is also associated with a counter,
its weight, which counts how many times the keyword has been added to the
profile. The weight basically measures how relevant a given keyword is with re-
spect to the other keywords in the profile. Keywords can be added by the user,
they can be extracted from her browsing history, as well as from her interaction
with Social Market. To simplify notation, we refer to a user and her profile with
the same symbol u ∈ U , where U is the universe of all user profiles. Profiles can
be compared with each other using a standard similarity metric. Even though
our solution can operate using any similarity metric, in the following, we make
use of the well known cosine similarity [19], which measures normalized overlap.
Sim(u1, u2) = cos(u1, u2) =
u1u2
||u1|| · ||u2||
Users interact with Social Market by proposing items that they wish to ex-
change with other users. An item can be, for example, an object to sell, an object
to buy, but it can also be a question that is being asked and that needs an answer.
When a user u creates an item, she associates it with an item profile, similar
to what is done in [2]. Structurally, an item profile is identical to a user profile.
Upon creation, the system initializes the item profile to the corresponding user
profile. The user then completes the creation by selecting which keywords from
this profile clone should be kept, which should be removed, and which, if any,
new keywords should be added.
In the example of Section 1, John creates an item for the Handel concert
in Paris. Prompted with a profile that contains, among other things: computer
science, cycling, mountaineering, violin, rock, and classical music, John decides
to keep only violin and classical music in the item profile. He then adds two
more keywords, Paris and Handel, and decides to keep only the latter in his
user profile as he’s not interested in being notified about other items associated
with Paris. Once an item has been created, the goal of Social Market is to lead
this item to meet other users who
– (i) are interested in the item,
– (ii) can be trusted and can trust the creator of the item,
– (iii) can be reached through a trusted path on the social network (Figure 1a).
To make this possible, Social Market users can create explicit social links.
While similar to friendship links in systems like Facebook, SM links also have
an additional feature: trust. Upon establishing a link, users declare how much
they trust each other by specifying a value in (0, 1]. The value of the trust link
is similar to the degree of friendship/confidence specified in some existing social
networks such as CouchSurfing1. In particular, if user A assigns a value close
to 0 to the link to a user B, it does not necessarily mean that A completely
distrusts B, but it may simply mean that A does not know B enough to express
a positive opinion.
In the following, we present our solution to address Social Market’s goals. In
this version of our work, we assume that two explicit friends always agree on a
trust value for the link they share. This yields an undirected social graph with arc
weights between 0 and 1. Extensions to the directed case as well as mechanisms
to guarantee high levels of privacy and resilience to attacks are outside the scope
of this paper and will be the subject of our future work.
3 Social Market
Identifying users that, at the same time, are interested in an item and towards
whom it is possible to identify a trusted path requires an effective protocol to
group users according to these two conflicting requirements. Recent research on
gossip-based protocols has shown their effectiveness in building overlays that
cluster nodes or users according to some distance function or similarity metric.
In this section, we extend this research by presenting a novel protocol capable
to provide each user or item with a set of neighbors that have highly similar
profiles and to which there is a trusted social path. Because users and items are
treated identically by our protocol, we refer to both with the term node.
(a) Importance of a trusted path: A se-
lects C, rather than B or D as a neigh-
bor even if it has a lower similarity
value because it is reachable through
a trusted path (high-trust links).
(b) Exchange of trust information (top)
and Short circuiting of trusted paths
(bottom)
Fig. 1
3.1 Background: Gossip-Based Implicit Networks
Protocols for gossip-based clustering generally consist of two layers. The bottom
one is a random peer sampling protocol (RPS) [11] which provides each node
with a continuously changing view of the network. The properties of the RPS
are such that the resulting topology, that is the union of all the RPS views, can
1 www.couchsurfing.org is a social community supporting the exchange of accommo-
dation between its users.
be assimilated to a random graph. This makes the RPS effective in maintaining
a connected overlay in the presence of disconnections and arrivals of new nodes.
The top layer is also a gossip-based overlay maintenance protocol and is based
on a variation of [20]. Specifically, at each gossip exchange, a node selects its
neighbors by choosing those with the best similarity values.
Social Market exploits a similar protocol structure. Instead of a random peer-
sampling layer, it applies our novel trust-aware peer-sampling protocol, TAPS.
TAPS provides the clustering protocol with candidate nodes that not only have
similar interests but that can also be trusted. The clustering protocol then uses
this information to select those that offer the best compromise between trust
and interest similarity as shown in Figure 1a.
To summarize, each node maintains three data structures: the explicit view,
the TAPS view, and the cluster view. The explicit view contains the node’s
explicit friends, while the other two are maintained by the TAPS and clustering
protocols as described in the following.
3.2 Trust-Aware Peer Sampling
TAPS follows the general structure of a peer-sampling protocol described in [11].
Its goal is to populate the TAPS view with an ever-changing set of references
to other nodes. Periodically, each node contacts a node selected from its TAPS
view and the two exchange subsets of their respective views.
In a standard peer-sampling protocol, each view entry contains at least in-
formation on how to contact the corresponding node (eg. IP address and port),
and an age or timestamp value indicating when the information in the entry was
generated. In TAPS, we introduce additional fields. First, as in [4], we add a user
profile. This makes it possible to cluster similar nodes together by computing
the cosine similarity of their profiles. In addition, we include an inferred trust
value, and a trusted path. The inferred trust value indicates the trust that a node
can have in another node. If the other node is a friend in the explicit network,
then the trust value corresponds to the one agreed upon when the friendship
relationship was established. Otherwise, it is an inferred value that depends on
the path that the trust information has taken during the gossip dissemination,
the trusted path.
Trust Propagation. Each edge in a trusted path carries some amount of uncer-
tainty about the trustworthiness of the target node even if all the nodes in the
path fully trust each other. To model this, we define the inferred trust of a path
as the product of the trust values of its edges, weighted by a trust transitivity
coefficient, τ , expressing how much a node values other nodes’ recommendations.
Given a path u1, u2..., un with trust values t1,2, t2,3..., tn−1,n, the inferred trust
between u1 and un is
t˜1,n = τ
n−2
i=n−1∏
i=1
ti,i+1,
Lower τ values cause trust to decay faster with path length. For example, with
τ = 0.7 trust decays from 1 to 0.49 in only three hops.
The ability to perform trust inference is what makes TAPS the perfect can-
didate for building our Social Market application. In the following we describe
the mechanisms that enable trust inference to be implemented in the context of
a gossip-based overlay protocol.
Initialization and View Exchanges. An inference process can only produce results
if it starts from some reliable initial values. In TAPS, these values are those
that have been agreed upon at the creation of explicit friendship relationships.
We therefore initialize the TAPS view by inserting one entry for each explicit
neighbor. During the course of the protocol, these entries are exchanged with
entries received from other nodes. Initially nodes providing new entries will be
the node’s explicit friends, then the node’s friends’ friends, and so on.
As the gossip process evolves, nodes collaborate in computing inferred trust
values. Consider a node A exchanging profiles with another node B as shown
in the top diagram of Figure 1b. A sends B a subset of its view as well as the
value it has for tAB , the inferred trust between A and B. B uses this information
to update the inferred trust values before adding the nodes to its own view.
Specifically, let tAX be the trust A has in X, then B computes its own trust for
X, tBX , as follows. First it verifies if it already has a value for tAB . If so, it keeps
the highest value between the received one and its own. It then uses the selected
tAB , to compute tBX as
tBX = τtABtAX .
During the course of dissemination, a node A will inevitably receive multiple
references for the same node X. Each of these may arrive from a different neigh-
bor and carry a different trust value. In the presence of multiple trust values for
the same reference, a node always selects the largest. However, two references
for the same node may also contain slight differences in the node’s profile, and
in this case, the node should keep the most recent information. To balance these
two needs, when A receives a reference to a node X, it chooses the highest trust
value between the one in its view and the one it received, and combines it with
the most recent profile. Because τ < 1, choosing the largest trust value guar-
antees that nodes always selects the most direct trust values, thus converging
towards shorter and shorter trusted paths. Nonetheless, some nodes may still be
unable to infer the trust of other nodes through the best social paths.
To enhance the chances of a successful trust inference, a node initiates gossip
exchanges not only towards nodes in its TAPS view but also to those in its
explicit neighbors. These additional gossip exchanges are executed every Texp
TAPS cycles and cause nodes to exchange entries from the unions of their TAPS
and explicit views. Explicit-view exchanges increase the probability that nodes
can infer trust through the shortest available paths.
Managing Trust Paths. When exchanging trust information with each other,
nodes also update the associated path information. Specifically, when a node A
receives a reference to node X from node B, it computes the associated path
pAX by concatenating pAB and pBX . Maintaining paths up to date is not only
necessary to enable users to enforce correct transactions in the social market
application, but it is also useful to correct the degradation of trust values caused
by possible loops in the inferred paths.
Consider the situation depicted in the bottom diagram of Figure 1b. Node
X holds a reference to D with a trust value tXD and a path going through Y
and sends it to A. Node A should combine this with the trust value it has for
node X, tAX , also obtained through Y . However, this would lead to a path that
uselessly goes twice through node Y and once through X.
Node A can prevent this by short circuiting the path, thus computing a
more accurate trust value. The problem is that the information received from X
only contains the identifiers of the nodes in the path and not their trust values.
Including such values in the path would allow the re-computation of trust, but
at the cost of disclosing trust information to third parties.
We therefore replace the re-computation of trust with the computation of a
lower bound. Specifically, A knows that the aggregated impact on trust of the
segment Y X cannot be greater than τn, n being the number of useless links in
the path, each link being counted once for each time it is traversed (n=2 in this
case). It can therefore conclude that the trust value of node D as seen from A,
TAD is at least:
tAD ≥ tXDtAX
τn
.
This makes it possible to increase the accuracy of trust inference without
disseminating private trust information to third parties.
3.3 Clustering Trusted Nodes
Our Trust-Aware Peer Sampling protocol provides each node with a continuously
changing set of nodes along with their inferred trust values. This constitutes a
source of information for our clustering protocol, a variation of the well-known
Vicinity protocol [20]. This protocol maintains a cluster view that collects the
nodes that offer the best compromise between trust and similarity.
Filling the Cluster View. In order to fill its cluster view, each node periodically
selects the node with the oldest timestamp and exchanges the content of its view
with it. Upon receipt of another node’s view, a node X combines the received
view, its own view, and its own TAPS view, and selects the entries that are
associated with the best trade-off between similarity and trust. Specifically, for
each entry N , X computes a score sXN as follows
sXN = Sim(X,N)
2−tXN,  ∈ [0, 2]
where , the trust weight, determines the importance of trust in the trade-off.
To speed up convergence, nodes also update their cluster views when they
receive new information through the TAPS protocol. In this case, they simply
combine the received TAPS view with the current cluster view and extract the
nodes with the best trade-off between trust and similarity. The selected nodes
replace those that were previously in the cluster view.
Trust Verification. The decentralized nature of our trust-inference protocol can
allow nodes to cheat on their trust values when communicating with nodes that
are not direct friends. For example, in Figure 1b (bottom), node D could try to
enter A’s cluster by making A believe that it has a high-trust link to node Y.
To prevent this, each node verifies the trust values of the entries in its clus-
ter view, once they have remained in the view for at least c cycles.2 To achieve
this, A asks D to forward a verification message back to A along the trusted
path. The message starts with a trust value of 1. Nodes along the path multi-
ply the message’s value by τ and by their trust for the node they received the
message from. Y thus multiplies 1 by τtY D in the example. In the absence of
colluding nodes, this process causes the verification message to reach A with the
correct value for tAD thereby invalidating D’s cheating attempts.
4 Evaluation
We evaluated the effectiveness of our approach by means of extensive simulations
on several data traces obtained from real social networks. In the following we
first present the details of our setting, and then discuss our results.
4.1 Setting
We evaluated our protocol on real data traces consisting of 3000 users extracted
from the Facebook and Digg social websites. The Facebook trace3 contains
friendship links and a list of social interactions. To obtain a treatable subset
for our experiments, we first cleaned up the trace by removing all users that had
only one friendship link, as they would be too isolated to benefit from our so-
cial platform. We then selected the user with the largest number of interactions
and proceeded in a spiral fashion by selecting her friends, then the friends of
her friends, and so on, until we reached 3000 users. We associated each of these
users with a random user profile from the Digg social network. We obtained
these profiles by crawling Digg in late 2010.
Friendship links in the Facebook trace and profiles in the Digg trace provided
the base explicit links and profiles for our experiments. On top of them, we built
several traces by varying the trust patterns between the nodes. We distinguish
our traces into two groups: binary and multi-valued. In both, we made the as-
sumption that the number of interactions between two nodes is a measure of
trust (this assumption is not part of the protocol itself).
Binary Traces. In binary traces we assigned a binary trust value to each link
in the data set. Specifically, we sorted the friends of each user according to the
number of interactions she had with them. Then, for a user with |N | friends, we
assigned a trust value of 1 to the β|N | directed links with the largest number of
2 Similar to [4], we choose c = 5.
3 Network A at http://current.cs.ucsb.edu/facebook/index.html.
interactions. Because, this process creates asymmetric trust values, we then set
the symmetric trust value of each link as the logical OR of the two asymmetric
values. These lead to the proportions of trusted links depicted in Figure 2a.
Multivalued Traces. While binary traces provide a simple experimental setting,
reality tends to be more complex. Thus, we also considered traces with trust
values of 1, 0.8, 0.5, and 0. Similar to the binary case, we sorted each user’s
friends by the number of interactions and assigned a trust value of 1 to the top
γ1|N |, a value of 0.8 to the following γ0.8|N | and so on, leading to the three
traces shown in Figure 2b.
4.2 Terms of Comparison
We compared the performance of our Social-Market solution against several
alternatives. First, we considered best, an ideal systems that, powered with global
knowledge, always provides each user with the set of neighbors that offer the best
combination of similarity and trust. This allows us to asses TAPS’s ability to
reach similar results in a decentralized way. Then we considered oracle: this
consists of a standard similarity-based implicit network [4], augmented with an
oracle that provides each user with the best trusted path to her neighbors. Oracle
therefore maximizes profile similarity at the cost of possibly lower trust values.
We also compared against two variations of our protocol. Full-trust is a ver-
sion in which nodes exchange complete trust information along with trusted
paths. This makes it possible to short-circuit long paths more accurately than
as described in Section 3.2 at the cost of disclosing trust values. Full-Trust is
only shown in multi-valued traces as it is equivalent to TAPS in binary ones.
TAPS no-bound is instead a version of TAPS in which nodes do not attempt
to short-circuit cycles thus yielding less accurate trust computation. Finally, un-
less otherwise specified, we ran our simulations using default values for τ and .
τ = 0.75 provides a good balance between trust decay and path length ( 0.56 at 3
hops, 0.23 at 6).  = 1 gives instead a fair tradeoff between trust and similarity.
4.3 Results
Impact of Trust Density. We start our performance comparison by examining
the results obtained in the various traces with a trust transitivity of τ = 0.75.
Our results, depicted in Figure 2c, show the average score values in the cluster
views with TAPS as well as with its competitors as percentages of best ’s scores.
TAPS’s performance is either comparable or better than that obtained by Or-
acle with the use of global knowledge. As expected, TAPS is particularly good
whenever the social network has a limited proportion of high-trust links (binary-
0.4 and multi-valued-1 and -2). This can be explained by observing that Oracle
always selects the nodes with the best cosine similarity and is therefore penalized
in networks where the density of high-trust links is lower. With smaller τ values,
we observed that TAPS outperforms Oracle in all the considered traces.
Name β % 1 % 0
Binary-0.4 0.4 53.5 46.5
Binary-0.6 0.6 71.3 28.7
Binary-0.7 0.7 80.7 19.3
Binary-0.8 0.8 89.3 10.7
(a) Binary Traces
Name % 1 % 0.5 % 0.25 % 0
MultiValued-1 41.3 23.8 23.4 11.5
MultiValued-2 57.4 27.9 13.3 1.4
MultiValued-3 76.2 12.3 10.1 1.4
(b) Multi-valued Traces (c) Impact of trust density
Fig. 2: Trust values distribution for different traces (left), impact of trust density
(right).
Impact of Trust Transitivity. Figure 3 confirms the above observation by exam-
ining the impact of trust transitivity, τ , on performance in the binary-0.8 (left)
and in the multi-value-1 traces. Results show that the performance of TAPS is
particularly good when trust decays faster. A faster decay gives more importance
to nodes that are closer in the social network even if they may have poorer sim-
ilarity values. This suggests that a protocol like TAPS becomes more and more
important when it is being used for important transactions and in situations in
which people can tolerate only limited amounts of risk.
(a) binary (b) multi-valued
Fig. 3: Impact of τ in the binary (left) and multi-valued (right) traces.
With very high values of τ trust decays more slowly. In this case, an proto-
col like Oracle that first finds the most similar nodes and then searches for a
trusted path may be viable. However, it should be noted that Oracle achieves
this through global knowledge. A distributed protocol to compute trusted paths
would probably be either very costly or ultimately equivalent to TAPS in net-
works characterized by a high trust density. Moreover, such a protocol would
remain inapplicable in situations where the density of trusted links is low, as
shown in Figure 2c.
Impact of Trust Weight. Next, we evaluate the impact of the trust-weight factor
on the performance of TAPS and its competitors. Figure 4 shows the result in
the binary (left) and multi-valued (right) traces respectively. Both plots show
that the benefits of a protocol like TAPS become more important as more weight
is placed on the trust between nodes. With values of  above 1, TAPS performs
better than Oracle even when considering its no-bound version.
(a) binary (b) multi-valued
Fig. 4: Impact of  in the binary (left) and multi-valued (right) traces.
In addition, the plots show that the importance of short-circuiting cyclic
paths is greater when the value of  is small. This is because smaller values make
it possible for the protocol to select nodes that are farther away in the social
network, which, in turn, makes the presence of cycles more likely.
Graph Properties of TAPS. To better understand the behavior of TAPS, we
conclude our evaluation by examining the properties of the TAPS overlay from
a graph-theoretical perspective. First we observe that convergence speed is com-
parable to that obtained with standard protocols: views reach 90% of their scores
within 15 cycles and completely converge after 80. Then we examine our TAPS
and clustered overlays in terms of clustering coefficient and in-degree distribution
to assess how close they are, respectively, to a random and a clustered graph.
Figure 5a shows the cumulative distributions of the local clustering coeffi-
cients of the nodes in our TAPS, and cluster views (TAPS and TAPS-cluster)
and compares them to those of a standard peer sampling protocol (RPS) and a
standard clustering protocol that does not consider trust (RPS-cluster). The plot
(in logarithmic scale) shows that, according to expectations, the TAPS topology
is slightly more clustered, and thus less uniformly random, than a standard RPS
topology. Conversely, our cluster topology is slightly less dense than the one
based on pure similarity.
The in-degree distribution shown in Figure 5b also shows some differences
with respect to traditional protocols. In this case, the difference is more accentu-
ated between TAPS and the RPS than for the corresponding clustered overlays.
The in-degree distribution of TAPS is in fact slightly skewed because nodes
(a) clustering coefficient (log scale) (b) in-degree
Fig. 5: Cumulative distributions of the local clustering coefficients (left) and of
the in-degree (right) distributions for TAPS-based and standard protocols.
that are not trusted by many others tend to have fewer neighbors. This is in-
deed a desirable property as untrusted nodes could potentially harm the system
through illicit behaviors. Moreover, while these differences are inherent in the
trust-dependence of the TAPS overlay, their small absolute value suggests that
TAPS could probably replace traditional protocols in a number of applications.
5 Related Work
The concept of trust in explicit social networks has been exploited in domains
ranging from peer-to-peer security to recommendation systems. SybilGuard [23]
and SybilLimit [22] propose protocols that exploit trust relationships between
friends to protect peer-to-peer systems from sybil attacks. Reliable Email [9]
uses a similar approach to build an email-whitelisting system based on friend-
to-friend relationships, while Ostra [18] exploits social trust to limit the incidence
of unwanted communication in messaging and content-sharing systems.
NABT [15] proposes the use of trust between friends to prevent freeriding
behaviors using a more efficient form of tit-for-tat based on indirect trust rela-
tionships. NABT’s credit-based approach can be viewed as a basic form of trust
inference between friends of friends. A more advanced approach to trust-inference
is adopted by SUNNY [14], a centralized protocol that takes into account both
trust and confidence to build a Bayesian network. Even if SUNNY is centralized,
its confidence-based idea could lead to interesting improvements for TAPS.
A number of research efforts have instead investigated the use of trust links
to improve the performance of recommendation systems. [21] uses an approach
similar to that of [14], while TrustWalker [10] combines trust and item-based
collaborative filtering. TaRS [17] builds a recommendation system capable of
operating both with global and with local trust metrics. Global trust metrics [7]
predict a global reputation value for each node. Local trust metrics [16], on the
other hand, take an approach similar to ours and compute trust values that are
dependent on the target user.
Despite the mole of work on social trust, Social Market is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first system to propose the use of trust relationships to build a
decentralized interest-based marketplace. Similarly, TAPS is the first attempt
to combine explicit and implicit social networks into a single gossip protocol.
Existing research on gossip protocols has addressed a number of problems in-
cluding data dissemination [5], aggregation [13], and overlay construction and
maintenance [12, 20]. In this context, the two contributions that are most closely
related to our work are [8], which uses gossip to disseminate news in explicit
networks, and [4], which proposed the use of gossip for implicit ones.
6 Conclusions and Future Directions
We presented Social Market (SM), a novel distributed application designed to
enable trusted collaborative actions between similar people in a social-network
environment. We proposed a solution to the challenges posed by SM in the form
a novel trust-aware peer-sampling protocol, TAPS, which creates an RPS-like
overlay taking into account the mutual trust expressed by users when joining
an explicit social network. Our experimental results show that, combined with a
clustering protocol, TAPS is highly effective in providing users with high-quality
implicit acquaintances that not only share similar interests but are also reachable
through a verifiable trusted path. This makes Social Market a promising plat-
form for the development of decentralized user-to-user transactions and warrants
further investigation into the use of trust to secure existing gossip protocols.
Our promising results encourage us to extend Social Market and TAPS in
a number of ways. First, we are examining the possibility of using asymmetric
trust values as opposed to symmetric ones. This would make it possible to render
trust information more private as users would not need to disclose to their friends
the trust they have for them. Second, even though the gossip nature of TAPS
makes it inherently self healing, we are considering solutions to maintain the
quality of trust paths even during churn by having nodes rely on trusted peers to
disseminate information while disconnected. Finally, we plan to explore the use of
multiple redundant trusted paths as a way to limit the effects of colluding nodes,
which cannot be tolerated by this version of the protocol. These improvements
will enable us to integrate TAPS in our existing prototype applications as a way
to reinforce the trust of users in disseminated information, recommendations, and
ultimately in the implementation of a real-world social-market platform.
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